You are correct about many things stated here. However Putin and his increasingly murdered and jailed Russian cleptocracy billionaire pals are unquestionably worse in every respect. Moreover, Russia chose to invade Ukraine in violation of the norms of international behavior. Whatever has happened and happens after that is on Putin. No one made him violate international boundaries by force.
I am not sure what you mean by "the norms of international behaviour". Behavioural norms do not govern state actions to the extent that they bound military conflict. International law as enshrined within the UN Charter, for example, nominally defines the rules governing the initiation and conduct of war, but the UN Charter is, like law in general, subject to interpretation and enforceability. Behavioural norms are not international law.
To claim that "whatever has happened and happens after that is on Putin" is to completely ignore the actions of the Ukrainian state and any other actor including the US and its allies, who have been active in Ukraine since 2014 and before, both politically and militarily.
Even in the face of published and explicit warnings that Russia's security interests required that Ukraine never possess nuclear weapons, Zelensky stated that he would pursue the acquisition of nuclear weapons. This was one of the final red lines that Ukraine crossed, which was a contributory triggering event. This statement was not forced from Zelensky by Putin, and Ukraine and all of its backers knew from Russia's long standing position, that further NATO expansion and/or the equipping of any more nations on its borders with nuclear weapons (whether autonomously or under the direct control of the US á la Romania and Poland) was unacceptable. This was all clearly stated in published proposals by Russia in December 2021.
This is just a fraction of the issues, before one considers 2014 onwards, Minsk, and all the things that have been subsequently admitted by the West relating to its own deliberate duplicity towards Russia. Germany, France and Ukraine have all now admitted that none of them ever intended to implement the Minsk accords, despite being moderators and bound by them, respectively.
The West was actively training and equipping Ukraine to NATO standards since 2014 and before, which is admitted by the USA. Even during 2014/15, Ukraine was claiming that it was making use of US supplied Javelin weapons to strike the Donbass, indicating direct US involvement in the internal civil war and its sponsorship of government forces.
The US's direct manipulation of Ukraine's political and judicial system is admitted by Victoria Nuland (US State Dept) and Joe Biden (then USA VP). This is not disputed and means that it will have been aware of and likely able to influence aspects of Minsk negotiation and implementation.
From Russia's perspective, as laid out in their statements, they were provoked by the West's actions in and sponsorship of ongoing attacks on the Donbass and the wilful abandonment of the Minsk agreements by Ukraine, France and Germany, which meant that what Russia described as a genocide against ethnically Russian civilians in the Donbass would continue unless it intervened.
It should be remembered that up until Feb 21st, 2022, Russia did not recognise the DPR or LPR and pressed for internal resolution of the civil conflict between DPR, LPR and wider Ukraine. This suggests that for the entire 8 year period of civil war, Russia did not play a political hand that it finally used before the invasion. It would have been in Russia's interest to play that hand any time earlier than it did so that it could invade when Ukraine was weaker than it was on Feb 24, 2022. Why didn't Russia act before this date when it always had that mechanism? Minsk 2 was violated and was failing to be implemented by Ukraine from, arguably, 2016 onwards in some respects, having been signed in Feb 2015.
Article 51 of the UN Charter should also be considered. While it is not discussed in the mainstream, what Russia did and presented in the context of Article 51 may mean that there is a case of "pre-emptive self defence" to consider, and or a case of Russia coming to the aid of an allied territory (which does not have to be recognised by any other state). Cases like this exist in international law and have been used to underpin US offensive and invasive actions against states in the past. If the illegality of Russia's invasion is clear under international law and the UN Charter, it will take no time to submit the necessary filings to the UN and ICC. A year after these "illegal" actions occurred, and there's been no such challenge. Why is that? The idea that the publicised calls for setting up a West-favoured investigation into Russian war crimes in combat is not the same thing. For anyone to challenge Russia's invasion under international law will be problematic because it will draw into question existing legal precedents, especially US actions which were deemed legal. There are specific reasons why Russia executed a sequence of moves and used specific language e.g. "Special Military Operation" and these are likely to have a basis in international law and its interpretation.
I figured you'd give me a long complicated "what aboutism" justification for the Russian invasion of the sovereign territory of another country, but I fully understand Ukraine's and the West's acknowledgement that this was a red line that cannot be crossed; particularly after the prior Russian invasions of Georgia, Crimea and the two eastern oblasts of Ukraine. Russian can spin its grievances against all former Eastern Bloc countries and Soviet republics into international invasions by force until and unless they are met with defensive force. Ukraine seeks only the return of its own sovereign territory.
It is very interesting that despite your insightful understanding of the weaknesses and illegal behaviors of the US and Western leadership with respect to their own citizens, particularly with respect to the Covid lockdowns and poison jab mandates, you say nothing at all about Putin and his criminal gang behavior vis a vis his own people and country.
Half-truths and half-replies are non-truths and non-replies.
My reply to you only served to address your absolute assertion that "Whatever has happened and happens after that is on Putin. No one made him violate international boundaries by force."
It is clear, in any dispute or conflict, that there are always at least two perspectives and usually more. Your assertion in no way takes this into account. It is provably false to claim that literally no one did anything that caused Russia to adopt a longstanding position on Ukraine that followed an escalatory trajectory. This was all clearly laid out by Western analysts including Mearsheimer and Cohen over 8 years ago, who have been borne out as prescient and correct. How did they conjure up the power to predict the biggest war on the European landmass since WW2? In part, by listening to Russian public statements going back to circa 1991, and comparing them to Western documents, statements and actions over the same period.
I have not employed whataboutery in my response. I have stated that the Russian perspective, which is the entire basis for its actions, should be considered and set in the context of UN Charter and the publicly documented events and statements of Russia and other agents. To fail to listen to or try to understand both sides in a conflict is to fail to understand anything about the conflict, irrespective of who's account is "right".
Please feel free to explain how I have resorted to whataboutery.
I have referenced the relative actions of other nations in the context of legal precedent. This is not whataboutery.
Please feel free to specify which aspects of my response in providing a high level and partial summary of Russia's stated position (which is its justification for its actions, assessible in international law) are inaccurate.
The Russo-Georgian war is unlikely to be fairly boiled down to "Russia's invasion of Georgia".
There are plenty of accounts that lay out US involvement in and sponsorship of Saakashvili's actions. Here's one in-depth and one brief account to consider:
Regarding Russia's annexation of Crimea, it was immediately recognised and strategically understood by the international community that Russia would never allow its strategic interests in Crimea fall out of its control, given that Sevastopol is its only deep warm water port and base of the Black Sea Fleet. This was borne out by Russia's near immediate move in Feb 2014 to secure the peninsula.
Rand Corporation's key findings on Russia's annexation of Crimea are:
Russia's Operation to Annex Crimea Represented Decisive and Competent Use of Military Force in Pursuit of Political Ends
- Russia was able to seize the territory of a neighboring state with speed and mobility.
- The political maneuvering on the peninsula during the invasion suggests that it may have been launched without a predetermined political outcome in mind.
- Russia likely sought to seize Crimea, and then evaluated its political options depending in part on how the intervention was received at home and abroad.
Russia's Operations in Crimea Benefited from a Series of Highly Favorable Circumstances That Makes It Difficult to Replicate
- These included political, historical, geographical, linguistic, and military advantages in the region that have only partial analogues elsewhere in the former Soviet republics.
- The confined geography of the peninsula, the proximity of Crimea to Russia, and its existence as a separate political unit within Ukraine gave Russia leverage.
- Russia's Black Sea Fleet was nearby, with legitimate transit routes that could be leveraged for a covert operation.
Russian Leaders Are Likely to Consider Eastern Ukraine to Be a Strategic Success but an Unsuccessful Operation
- Russia's efforts in Eastern Ukraine proved to be a series of improvisations in response to resistance and friction when the initial political warfare effort foundered.
- The lessons of Eastern Ukraine are rather mixed, demonstrating the limits of low-cost asymmetrical approaches even against a relatively weak and vulnerable state.
- Russia achieved its primary objectives but at a much higher cost than desired and through a fitful cycle of adaptation.
Notable is the lack of ability of the international community to directly and overtly respond to Russia's action in Crimea, despite it being called illegal. This is a partial demonstration of the mechanism and enforceability of international law. As a response, the Ukrainian government repeatedly and deliberately deprived the peninsula of water supplies from the mainland to damage the entire populace of the peninsula, eventually forcing Russia to spend circa $100m on desalination plants. That's a strange tactic to wage against one's own people on an indiscriminate basis.
I am not a commentator on the internal view of Russia. I comment on Ukraine in the manner I have done because aspects of it are a means by which to assess the integrity of the West's own narrative and policies. It, like many other events, are a foil.
VST doesn't support Russia's actions in Ukraine and nothing it has written has ever expressed such a sentiment.
War is justified by those who prosecute it. It is for others to judge those justifications. In most cases, there is no clear case of a just war, and in all cases there were chances to avert the war and innumerable cases of unjustified slaughter. This goes without saying.
What is odd about the Ukrainian war is that in the short time it has been raging, the Western narrative has collapsed in on itself under the weight of evidence that comes from both the West and that is put forward by Russia e.g. biolabs. Behaviours also betray serious shortcomings e.g. UN denial of investigations into Biolabs and likely NS2. Refusal of Russian access to NS and the withholding of investigatory findings by Sweden. The total silence of the international community about NS and the almost complete lack of demand for answers, despite the fact that there's only a limited number of state level actors who could have carried out the attack. Russia has been eliminated from the suspect list by the European investigations, despite the instant accusation by the West in the face on any sensible business case for Russia to destroy its own property.
The entire point of this article and its precursor was to flag and then backtest narrative that is peddled by provable liars. In this case, in just twelve months, the West's Ukraine war narrative has proven to be largely false. Thus, to then ally to the West's claim that "this is all Putin's fault" seems ill advised at best, and foolish at worst.
VST does not believe and never has believed the Western assertion that Russia intended to invade any other nation, and it is increasingly understood that the West's deliberate strategic, tactical and operational actions in Ukraine since 2017 and before have driven towards forms of provocation and the extension of the conflict. This is proven by public statements VST has cited before, and by Sen. Lindsay Graham for example, as well as Britain, France, Germany and Ukraine. The problem with the Ukrainian conflict is that the Ukrainians and the West can't get their story straight and keep it straight.
By contrast, Russia's story has been straight for over 20 years, its actions are in line with that story and, so far, it doesn't seem to have been bluffing, even if it has been patient to a fault and left things to what it states was the last minute. The Russian narrative has remained consistent and VST has deliberately tracked both side's narratives in the hope of evaluating credibility and predicting an outcome.
People make the fundamental claim that Russia's invasion is illegal, and that is likely the case subject to credible legal analysis under international law in the face of all available evidence on both sides. However, it is the Ukrainian and Western side that is being shown to have lied about key elements (Minsk, NATO and US direct involvement, Nord Stream) and acted in ways that are literally off the charts of what you refer to as "norms of international behaviour", including the Ukrainian shelling of nuclear power stations and the attack on Nord Stream, which literally transcends all other forms of terrorist attack on grounds of both scale and complexity, before one considers the true damage and attributable body count of the NS attack.
You can argue the legalities with the others in the ICC. War comes down to warfighting capability to drive the opponent into a defeat or negotiated settlement, as all western citizens should fully understand by now, given the number of wars (almost all illegal) that the West has initiated.
Only tiny fish end up in the ICC. Great Powers arbitrate disputes through war in extremis, as we see here. That is another truth that is best fully accepted.
Time will tell if Russia has outplayed the West at the Great Game. If that causes you pain to the point that you rail only at Russia, I would argue that it is in your interest to seek better and more competent representation such that we regain our competitiveness in the Great Game. If it isn't already too late.
These patterns of behaviour are knowable, predictable and avoidable, and that's the ongoing tragedy of the human condition when it comes to all wars.
" I am not a commentator on the internal view of Russia. I comment on Ukraine in the manner I have done because aspects of it are a means by which to assess the integrity of the West's own narrative and policies." Why not??? You comment on everything else. Is someone or something preventing you from commenting on the cleptocrats running Russia?
Yes yes yes. Do not comply!
You are correct about many things stated here. However Putin and his increasingly murdered and jailed Russian cleptocracy billionaire pals are unquestionably worse in every respect. Moreover, Russia chose to invade Ukraine in violation of the norms of international behavior. Whatever has happened and happens after that is on Putin. No one made him violate international boundaries by force.
Thank you for your comment.
I am not sure what you mean by "the norms of international behaviour". Behavioural norms do not govern state actions to the extent that they bound military conflict. International law as enshrined within the UN Charter, for example, nominally defines the rules governing the initiation and conduct of war, but the UN Charter is, like law in general, subject to interpretation and enforceability. Behavioural norms are not international law.
To claim that "whatever has happened and happens after that is on Putin" is to completely ignore the actions of the Ukrainian state and any other actor including the US and its allies, who have been active in Ukraine since 2014 and before, both politically and militarily.
Even in the face of published and explicit warnings that Russia's security interests required that Ukraine never possess nuclear weapons, Zelensky stated that he would pursue the acquisition of nuclear weapons. This was one of the final red lines that Ukraine crossed, which was a contributory triggering event. This statement was not forced from Zelensky by Putin, and Ukraine and all of its backers knew from Russia's long standing position, that further NATO expansion and/or the equipping of any more nations on its borders with nuclear weapons (whether autonomously or under the direct control of the US á la Romania and Poland) was unacceptable. This was all clearly stated in published proposals by Russia in December 2021.
This is just a fraction of the issues, before one considers 2014 onwards, Minsk, and all the things that have been subsequently admitted by the West relating to its own deliberate duplicity towards Russia. Germany, France and Ukraine have all now admitted that none of them ever intended to implement the Minsk accords, despite being moderators and bound by them, respectively.
The West was actively training and equipping Ukraine to NATO standards since 2014 and before, which is admitted by the USA. Even during 2014/15, Ukraine was claiming that it was making use of US supplied Javelin weapons to strike the Donbass, indicating direct US involvement in the internal civil war and its sponsorship of government forces.
The US's direct manipulation of Ukraine's political and judicial system is admitted by Victoria Nuland (US State Dept) and Joe Biden (then USA VP). This is not disputed and means that it will have been aware of and likely able to influence aspects of Minsk negotiation and implementation.
From Russia's perspective, as laid out in their statements, they were provoked by the West's actions in and sponsorship of ongoing attacks on the Donbass and the wilful abandonment of the Minsk agreements by Ukraine, France and Germany, which meant that what Russia described as a genocide against ethnically Russian civilians in the Donbass would continue unless it intervened.
It should be remembered that up until Feb 21st, 2022, Russia did not recognise the DPR or LPR and pressed for internal resolution of the civil conflict between DPR, LPR and wider Ukraine. This suggests that for the entire 8 year period of civil war, Russia did not play a political hand that it finally used before the invasion. It would have been in Russia's interest to play that hand any time earlier than it did so that it could invade when Ukraine was weaker than it was on Feb 24, 2022. Why didn't Russia act before this date when it always had that mechanism? Minsk 2 was violated and was failing to be implemented by Ukraine from, arguably, 2016 onwards in some respects, having been signed in Feb 2015.
Article 51 of the UN Charter should also be considered. While it is not discussed in the mainstream, what Russia did and presented in the context of Article 51 may mean that there is a case of "pre-emptive self defence" to consider, and or a case of Russia coming to the aid of an allied territory (which does not have to be recognised by any other state). Cases like this exist in international law and have been used to underpin US offensive and invasive actions against states in the past. If the illegality of Russia's invasion is clear under international law and the UN Charter, it will take no time to submit the necessary filings to the UN and ICC. A year after these "illegal" actions occurred, and there's been no such challenge. Why is that? The idea that the publicised calls for setting up a West-favoured investigation into Russian war crimes in combat is not the same thing. For anyone to challenge Russia's invasion under international law will be problematic because it will draw into question existing legal precedents, especially US actions which were deemed legal. There are specific reasons why Russia executed a sequence of moves and used specific language e.g. "Special Military Operation" and these are likely to have a basis in international law and its interpretation.
I figured you'd give me a long complicated "what aboutism" justification for the Russian invasion of the sovereign territory of another country, but I fully understand Ukraine's and the West's acknowledgement that this was a red line that cannot be crossed; particularly after the prior Russian invasions of Georgia, Crimea and the two eastern oblasts of Ukraine. Russian can spin its grievances against all former Eastern Bloc countries and Soviet republics into international invasions by force until and unless they are met with defensive force. Ukraine seeks only the return of its own sovereign territory.
It is very interesting that despite your insightful understanding of the weaknesses and illegal behaviors of the US and Western leadership with respect to their own citizens, particularly with respect to the Covid lockdowns and poison jab mandates, you say nothing at all about Putin and his criminal gang behavior vis a vis his own people and country.
Half-truths and half-replies are non-truths and non-replies.
My reply to you only served to address your absolute assertion that "Whatever has happened and happens after that is on Putin. No one made him violate international boundaries by force."
It is clear, in any dispute or conflict, that there are always at least two perspectives and usually more. Your assertion in no way takes this into account. It is provably false to claim that literally no one did anything that caused Russia to adopt a longstanding position on Ukraine that followed an escalatory trajectory. This was all clearly laid out by Western analysts including Mearsheimer and Cohen over 8 years ago, who have been borne out as prescient and correct. How did they conjure up the power to predict the biggest war on the European landmass since WW2? In part, by listening to Russian public statements going back to circa 1991, and comparing them to Western documents, statements and actions over the same period.
I have not employed whataboutery in my response. I have stated that the Russian perspective, which is the entire basis for its actions, should be considered and set in the context of UN Charter and the publicly documented events and statements of Russia and other agents. To fail to listen to or try to understand both sides in a conflict is to fail to understand anything about the conflict, irrespective of who's account is "right".
Please feel free to explain how I have resorted to whataboutery.
I have referenced the relative actions of other nations in the context of legal precedent. This is not whataboutery.
Please feel free to specify which aspects of my response in providing a high level and partial summary of Russia's stated position (which is its justification for its actions, assessible in international law) are inaccurate.
The Russo-Georgian war is unlikely to be fairly boiled down to "Russia's invasion of Georgia".
There are plenty of accounts that lay out US involvement in and sponsorship of Saakashvili's actions. Here's one in-depth and one brief account to consider:
https://fpif.org/us_role_in_georgia_crisis/
https://www.wired.com/2008/08/did-us-military/
Regarding Russia's annexation of Crimea, it was immediately recognised and strategically understood by the international community that Russia would never allow its strategic interests in Crimea fall out of its control, given that Sevastopol is its only deep warm water port and base of the Black Sea Fleet. This was borne out by Russia's near immediate move in Feb 2014 to secure the peninsula.
Rand Corporation's key findings on Russia's annexation of Crimea are:
Russia's Operation to Annex Crimea Represented Decisive and Competent Use of Military Force in Pursuit of Political Ends
- Russia was able to seize the territory of a neighboring state with speed and mobility.
- The political maneuvering on the peninsula during the invasion suggests that it may have been launched without a predetermined political outcome in mind.
- Russia likely sought to seize Crimea, and then evaluated its political options depending in part on how the intervention was received at home and abroad.
Russia's Operations in Crimea Benefited from a Series of Highly Favorable Circumstances That Makes It Difficult to Replicate
- These included political, historical, geographical, linguistic, and military advantages in the region that have only partial analogues elsewhere in the former Soviet republics.
- The confined geography of the peninsula, the proximity of Crimea to Russia, and its existence as a separate political unit within Ukraine gave Russia leverage.
- Russia's Black Sea Fleet was nearby, with legitimate transit routes that could be leveraged for a covert operation.
Russian Leaders Are Likely to Consider Eastern Ukraine to Be a Strategic Success but an Unsuccessful Operation
- Russia's efforts in Eastern Ukraine proved to be a series of improvisations in response to resistance and friction when the initial political warfare effort foundered.
- The lessons of Eastern Ukraine are rather mixed, demonstrating the limits of low-cost asymmetrical approaches even against a relatively weak and vulnerable state.
- Russia achieved its primary objectives but at a much higher cost than desired and through a fitful cycle of adaptation.
Notable is the lack of ability of the international community to directly and overtly respond to Russia's action in Crimea, despite it being called illegal. This is a partial demonstration of the mechanism and enforceability of international law. As a response, the Ukrainian government repeatedly and deliberately deprived the peninsula of water supplies from the mainland to damage the entire populace of the peninsula, eventually forcing Russia to spend circa $100m on desalination plants. That's a strange tactic to wage against one's own people on an indiscriminate basis.
I am not a commentator on the internal view of Russia. I comment on Ukraine in the manner I have done because aspects of it are a means by which to assess the integrity of the West's own narrative and policies. It, like many other events, are a foil.
VST doesn't support Russia's actions in Ukraine and nothing it has written has ever expressed such a sentiment.
War is justified by those who prosecute it. It is for others to judge those justifications. In most cases, there is no clear case of a just war, and in all cases there were chances to avert the war and innumerable cases of unjustified slaughter. This goes without saying.
What is odd about the Ukrainian war is that in the short time it has been raging, the Western narrative has collapsed in on itself under the weight of evidence that comes from both the West and that is put forward by Russia e.g. biolabs. Behaviours also betray serious shortcomings e.g. UN denial of investigations into Biolabs and likely NS2. Refusal of Russian access to NS and the withholding of investigatory findings by Sweden. The total silence of the international community about NS and the almost complete lack of demand for answers, despite the fact that there's only a limited number of state level actors who could have carried out the attack. Russia has been eliminated from the suspect list by the European investigations, despite the instant accusation by the West in the face on any sensible business case for Russia to destroy its own property.
The entire point of this article and its precursor was to flag and then backtest narrative that is peddled by provable liars. In this case, in just twelve months, the West's Ukraine war narrative has proven to be largely false. Thus, to then ally to the West's claim that "this is all Putin's fault" seems ill advised at best, and foolish at worst.
VST does not believe and never has believed the Western assertion that Russia intended to invade any other nation, and it is increasingly understood that the West's deliberate strategic, tactical and operational actions in Ukraine since 2017 and before have driven towards forms of provocation and the extension of the conflict. This is proven by public statements VST has cited before, and by Sen. Lindsay Graham for example, as well as Britain, France, Germany and Ukraine. The problem with the Ukrainian conflict is that the Ukrainians and the West can't get their story straight and keep it straight.
By contrast, Russia's story has been straight for over 20 years, its actions are in line with that story and, so far, it doesn't seem to have been bluffing, even if it has been patient to a fault and left things to what it states was the last minute. The Russian narrative has remained consistent and VST has deliberately tracked both side's narratives in the hope of evaluating credibility and predicting an outcome.
People make the fundamental claim that Russia's invasion is illegal, and that is likely the case subject to credible legal analysis under international law in the face of all available evidence on both sides. However, it is the Ukrainian and Western side that is being shown to have lied about key elements (Minsk, NATO and US direct involvement, Nord Stream) and acted in ways that are literally off the charts of what you refer to as "norms of international behaviour", including the Ukrainian shelling of nuclear power stations and the attack on Nord Stream, which literally transcends all other forms of terrorist attack on grounds of both scale and complexity, before one considers the true damage and attributable body count of the NS attack.
You can argue the legalities with the others in the ICC. War comes down to warfighting capability to drive the opponent into a defeat or negotiated settlement, as all western citizens should fully understand by now, given the number of wars (almost all illegal) that the West has initiated.
Only tiny fish end up in the ICC. Great Powers arbitrate disputes through war in extremis, as we see here. That is another truth that is best fully accepted.
Time will tell if Russia has outplayed the West at the Great Game. If that causes you pain to the point that you rail only at Russia, I would argue that it is in your interest to seek better and more competent representation such that we regain our competitiveness in the Great Game. If it isn't already too late.
These patterns of behaviour are knowable, predictable and avoidable, and that's the ongoing tragedy of the human condition when it comes to all wars.
" I am not a commentator on the internal view of Russia. I comment on Ukraine in the manner I have done because aspects of it are a means by which to assess the integrity of the West's own narrative and policies." Why not??? You comment on everything else. Is someone or something preventing you from commenting on the cleptocrats running Russia?
Excellent! Balanced and factual as are both of your replies. Brilliant. Thank you.