Ritter Russian Retrospective 01: Pre-Invasion

A series seeking to qualitatively back test Scott Ritter's output on Russia in Ukraine

Judging the quality and accuracy of any commentator, analyst or pundit is difficult for a variety of reasons, especially on a qualitative basis or in the absence of specific, hard or measurable predictions or forecasts. Substantial back testing is rarely undertaken in the mainstream; punditry is a short-term free-for-all, commentary is largely punditry and analysts need to be evaluated and not just believed on the basis of marketed credentials. Talking head “experts” are marketing tools peddling and spinning messaging to affect perception and often push an agenda or justify an outcome before they are anything else.

What must be accepted is that no one can be 100% right on anything, least of all the dynamics of largescale war in which one does not play a direct role that affords wide access to solid information about what’s happening, what will happen and why.

Re Ukraine, all western analysts lack access to the Russian war machine so are multiply removed from half the information governing the war, before one considers their (in)access to their own side’s war machine. Therefore, the value of analysis lies not just in the analysis itself but also the ability of the reader to parse it and accept limitations and constraints that apply, and the context in terms of both time and scope, while accepting reliability and accuracy will be variable. How analysis is used is key; it will not be right in every respect most, maybe all times and so to judge analysts on absolute terms without factoring limitations, constraints, context etc is unrealistic. Analysis is rendered invalid or out-of-date by events outside of the analysis. On the flip side, a stopped clock is right twice a day and a horoscope can always seem to relate to something that did happen if written in sufficiently vague language; “maybe” is the ultimate get-out clause.

Former US Marine Officer and UN Weapons Inspector, Scott Ritter, is renowned for being famously outspoken on the military political stage since his public stance on the Iraqi WMD issue. Leading up to and throughout the Ukrainian war, he’s been unflinching in laying out his analysis and opinion about it. He’s been willing to make explicit predictions, leaving him open to retrospective criticism or vindication. VST has followed his outlook and, from time to time, attempted to assess its accuracy and prescience. Ritter has been, in significant part, a useful analyst whose views carry weight and insight borne out of military and intelligence experience, and historical awareness.

In these articles, VST will attempt to drill into key excerpts of Ritter’s output in greater detail and try to evaluate his consistency, accuracy and therefore value on Ukraine, taking one of his articles at a time. Two caveats apply: VST’s own interpretive bias will likely come into play; judging what Ritter gets provably right and wrong may be harder to do than one might imagine.

Pre-Invasion

10th January 2022: What War with Russia Would Look Like

Ryabkov has alluded to a fact already made clear by the Russians—there will be no compromise when it comes to Russia’s legitimate national security interests. And if the U.S. cannot understand how the accumulation of military power encompassed in a military alliance which views Russia as a singular, existential threat to its members’ security is seen by Russia as threatening, then there is no comprehension of how the events of June 22, 1941 have shaped the present -day Russian psyche, why Russia will never again allow such a situation to occur, and why the talks are doomed before they even begin.

In other words, Ritter’s view was we had reached a point at which Russia determined that it must directly and determinedly declare the threats to its national interest that it felt were being persistently and relentlessly presented, then deal with them effectively. Those threats were embodied by an expanding NATO whose chief member, the USA, openly declared Russia a threat to USA interests, having constantly pursued deliberate plans and strategies to against Russia (see RAND et al). Failure by the west to put itself in Russia’s shoes and empathise with how Russia might feel and react, represented baked-in political and diplomatic failure if the point of politics and diplomacy is to sufficiently get along while avoiding destructive means to force compromise. Ritter said that Russia was at loggerheads with the west and NATO, and - given Russia’s history of being multiply invaded at great cost - this time Russia’s leadership would no longer solely rely on political and diplomatic actions of those who failed to empathise with its view.

As for the American threats, Russia has given its response—any effort to sanction Russia would result, as Putin told Biden last month, in a “complete rupture of relations” between Russia and those countries attempting sanctions. One need not be a student of history to comprehend that the next logical step following a “complete rupture of relations” between two parties that are at loggerheads over matters pertaining to existential threats to the national security of one or both is not the peaceful resumption of relations, but war.

Sanctions are considered by many to be synonymous with, if not equivalent to, acts of war. They have been shown to have potentially devastating effects on nation states depending upon the state’s standing, networks, allegiances and ability to compensate and circumvent them. It is only logical to expect sanctions placed on any major power to be viewed as a hostile act with attendant negative impact on relations between the nations involved. Ritter is simply recalling common knowledge. His prediction here is simple: if you wield sanctions against capable nations, you are building up to - if not actually waging - a form of war, and should therefore expect full blown war to eventually result.

The obvious challenge to the above is “Russia was only sanctioned after it invaded.” That is only true if one narrows sanctions down from January 2022 in the context of Ukraine. Recall in 2021 that the US accused Russia of “harmful foreign activities” including the Solarwinds hack, 2020 election interference, poisoning Alexei Navalny (another non-fatal “Russian poisoning”). It then unilaterally imposed sanctions on Russia. Russia denied involvement in all of the activities. Since then, much of the US’s claims of Russian interference in the US have been called into question or proven to be outright lies, and yet Russia was sanctioned on the basis of those lies.

What is the difference between fabricating a WMD pretext to justify invasive war and fabricating a “harmful activities” pretext (in whole or in part) in order to impose sanctions?

The challenge that “Russia was only sanctioned after it invaded” fails to account for the holistic view of Russia’s situation, and its need to break out of a catch 22 situation. Holistically, Russia said it was being deliberately hemmed in by USEUNATO strategies to place increasing threats around its border while simply being told by people it provably couldn’t trust that “these aren’t threats to you, we promise.” Resisting that politically or diplomatically had constantly failed since 1991. Therefore, Russia was left knowing that whatever it did to further resist, be it a backed or unbacked threat of force, would garner further sanctions response that in itself is escalatory. Ukraine is not a NATO member, nor an EU state and for USEUNATO to de facto treat it as such, going as far as to wield global sanctions through it, reinforces Russia’s view of the threat landscape. Ukraine was treated as a de facto NATO member by USEUNATO up to and throughout the war, short of triggering a full-blown article 5 response.

There is no mealy-mouthed posturing by Foggy Bottom peacocks taking place in Moscow, but rather a cold, hard, statement of fact—ignore Russia’s demands at you[r] own peril. The U.S., it seems, believes that the worst-case scenario is one where Russia invades Ukraine, only to wilt under the sustained pressure of economic sanctions and military threats.

Russia’s worse-case scenario is one where it engages in armed conflict with NATO.

Generally speaking, the side that is most prepared for the reality of armed conflict will prevail.

Russia has been preparing for this possibility for more than a year. It has repeatedly shown a capability to rapidly mobilize 100,000-plus combat-ready forces in short order. NATO has shown an ability to mobilize 30,000 after six-to-nine-months of extensive preparations.

In hindsight, VST believes it is fair for Ritter to say that the west thought that sanctions would indeed seriously weaken Russia and decisively undermine its ability or will to persist in the Ukrainian theatre. Per RAND:

Imposing deeper trade and financial sanctions would also likely degrade the Russian economy, especially if such sanctions are comprehensive and multilateral. Thus, their effectiveness will depend on the willingness of other countries to join in such a process. But sanctions come with costs and, depending on their severity, considerable risks.

Further sanctions, the removal of Russia from non-UN international forums, and boycotting such events as the World Cup could be implemented by Western states and would damage Russian prestige. But the extent to which these steps would damage Russian domestic stability is uncertain.

Ritter was of the opinion that Russia more accurately foresaw the immediate future and prepared more deeply and holistically for it than than the west. Knowing that it would have to stand up for its interests, Russia was better prepared for the extremis of total war, including sanctions and global political and diplomatic fall out, than the west thought Russia was and than the west was itself. The west had not, in Ritter’s view, prepared holistically. The Ukraine war called out the west’s vision and preparedness. Militarily, it had not sufficiently prepared for the bear leaving its cave. It placed too great an expectation on how sanctions would perform and affect Russia. The US, EU and UK are all actively pursuing the seizure and/or appropriation of Russian state and individual foreign assets, with even the stated intent to spend them as they see fit. The US, EU, UK, Japan and Australia are all jointly engaged in anti-Russian sanctions (links connect to lists of sanctions in force now) that are admitted and shown to have insufficient effect on reigning in the bear.

In hindsight, based on economic data, political outcomes (who supports and engages in sanctions, who is still involved with Russia), the continuation of the war and what is stated by the western press, US sanctions have failed to prevent Russia from persisting in its actions in Ukraine and globally. They have had clear blowback both politically and economically, impacting life in the EU at the very least. This in part demonstrates that, per RAND, the costs and risks of sanctions against Russia are high. What must also be considered is that imposition of these sanctions is forcing Russia to evolve and circumvent them, which will further diminish the effectiveness of western sanctions as time goes on.

Ritter was right to say that sanctions would have an unpredictable effect on Russia’s domestic situation. It would appear that they have helped bolster internal support for Putin for the time being and accelerated Russia’s activities among the “global majority”.

Further, NATO’s forces and the ability to employ them in totality against Russia under the present circumstances of the Ukraine war are constrained precisely because Ukraine is not a member nation. NATO’s circumvention of that constraint has caused it to deplete its war stocks and thereby create a new constraint of replenishment lead time. Provided Russia is ahead on this constraint, NATO is at a disadvantage because it has fed a proxy war with its supplies while being unable to properly use its troops in addition to those of Ukraine.

What would a conflict between Russia and NATO look like? In short, not like anything NATO has prepared for. Time is the friend of NATO in any such conflict—time to let sanctions weaken the Russian economy, and time to allow NATO to build up sufficient military power to be able to match Russia’s conventional military strength.

Russia knows this, and as such, any Russian move will be designed to be both swift and decisive.

Ritter makes an important point about time, and many will jump on him for the term “swift and decisive”.

VST believes Ritter was right about time. What is now shown by the conflict is that its intensity and tempo (set mainly by Russia) has exposed NATO equipment and arms limitations that are cutting deep enough to expose each member state’s paucity of supply. If sanctions need time to bite, that’s only true if the sanctions can ever bite, and Russia appears to be doing enough to shake them off in quick order. That the west now really does need time to replenish war stocks, this presents a growing asymmetry of power that goes beyond the Ukrainian theatre that is reflected in the changing power structures and strategic partnerships around the globe.

Regarding “swift and decisive”, the obvious challenge is that Ukraine is not “swift or decisive” because: in the first two months, the Ukrainians started fighting properly and Russia’s been up to its neck since; the war has “dragged on” for 15 months and that’s not swift; Russia’s losses means this isn’t decisive. First, what war on this scale involving so many actors and resources was ever done in a few months? Second, one must recognise phase change and the major causes of those changes. Russia did almost bring Ukraine to heel in the initial phase until the west said it would massively enter the war. Third, the size of Russia’s objective of “demilitarisation” must be understood in the context of its methods as reflected by both phase and strategy evolution, as well as the ongoing measurable performance against that objective.

Ukraine is total, hybrid, modern war on a scale not seen since WW2. In that context, Russia has significantly depleted Ukraine’s native and imported manpower and materiel, while seeming to possess sufficient stocks to attrit Ukraine and its sponsors. If Russia does attrit Ukraine that could eventually be decisive in some way. “Swiftness” is a variable that carries risk of loss, which changes the attrition dynamic. This is illustrated by the “grinding” nature of battles that have taken time to play out but on a net basis have resulted in greater Ukrainian losses.

If Russia’s initial invasion had resulted in capitulation of Ukraine, as it nearly did, that would have been incredibly swift and Ritter would have been “right”. The west reacted to deliberately affect that outcome in ways and on a scale that were difficult to fully anticipate as reflected by the west’s willingness to constantly escalate beyond all of its claimed red lines. Ritter’s article does not account for that. It dealt with the known situation as of January 2022. The west entered the war in March/April 2022. Russia then had to react in ways it deemed appropriate. As of January 2022, Ritter alluded to something that nearly happened in one way, and in light of dynamics since, could still happen: a clear (decisive) outcome that took relatively little time to occur compared to the size of the forces in play. Time and force will tell.

VST doesn’t believe that Ritter is abjectly and definitively wrong here. We haven’t seen Russia at maximum force and likely won’t in this conflict. It can still end swiftly in real terms and decisively.

First and foremost, if it comes to it, when Russia decides to move on Ukraine, it will do so with a plan of action that has been well-thought out and which sufficient resources have been allocated for its successful completion. Russia will not get involved in a military misadventure in Ukraine that has the potential of dragging on and on, like the U.S. experience in Afghanistan and Iraq. Russia has studied an earlier U.S. military campaign—Operation Desert Storm, of Gulf War I—and has taken to heart the lessons of that conflict.

Ritter credits Russia with a lot of forethought and planning such that one might say he believed that Russia’s Plan A persisted beyond Phase 1 of the war. This is difficult if not impossible to know without access to the Russian plan. It may actually be that Plan A comprised:

1. Try a fast entry with a limited force to threaten Kiev and bring it to the table ASAP;

2. If that doesn’t work, consolidate a defensible position in the relevant territories;

3. Use mobilisation to increase our potential force;

4. Attrit Ukraine on the frontline and tactically in the rear;

5. Escalate widespread attrition at all levels from C&C, supply and frontline as appropriate;

6. Balance: civilian and Russian losses; kinetic overstepping/excessive use of force; offense as defence (react appropriately to what actually happens); force employed to resistance encountered.

If the above was the Russian Plan A, then all of it would still apply today and we could still be in Plan A. Unlikely that this is the case. “No plan survives first contact” is a given in war. However, that’s not to say that Russia did not have workable anticipatory plans for modelled evolving scenarios, which is fundamental to warfighting, or simply replanned on the fly in light of the changing battlefield, as one would expect in any war.

Ritter cites Iraq and Afghanistan as lessons from which Russia has learned. Desert Storm - a multi-party overwhelming action that put Hussein back in his borders but did not wreck the country and change the regime - was one large operation. It gave way to a much, much longer engagement that led to the Iraq invasion that devolved into insurgency and civil war because of the way the USA and allies chose to conduct multiple phases or campaigns. The removal of Saddam Hussein was an extremely costly and protracted affair with huge body count. Afghanistan was equally bad, if not more so given the guerrilla force that the Taliban used to represent outlasting the USA for 20 years.

In Ukraine, Russia is on its own. It is not fighting as part of a 40-nation coalition who ganged up against a single country that had no air defence network. Ritter was not saying that we should have expected Desert Storm-like “results” by Russia in Ukraine. Nor can it be said, even now, that Russia is “bogged down” in Ukraine. It is fighting an attrition war on a stable frontline and inflicting much greater losses for the time being.

One does not need to occupy the territory of a foe in order to destroy it. A strategic air campaign designed to nullify specific aspects of a nations’ capability, whether it be economic, political, military, or all the above, coupled with a focused ground campaign designed to destroy an enemy’s army as opposed to occupy its territory, is the likely course of action.

Here Ritter describes a generalised approach to war, rather than provide a specific prediction of exactly how the Russian’s would prosecute the Ukraine war. Ritter makes specific and astute observations about the nature of some kinds of war. What’s prescient is that Ritter is highlighting a war strategy that Russia has been employing: attrition over expanding territorial occupation.

If we take that outline and apply it in hindsight to the initial phase of Ukraine, we must remember that Russia’s stated and persistent goals include “demilitarisation and denazification”, which serve to ground Ritter’s outline because he knows what “demilitarisation” means in practical terms. He stated that winning a war is not necessarily about territorial occupation. If one removes the ability for a nation to fight, its territorial defence is a secondary and moot concern. Russia’s air campaign has not aped that seen in US conflicts because of Ukraine’s soviet and western air defence, combined with what appears to be Russia’s attempt to use “just enough” force to achieve political capitulation combined with the ongoing general “demilitarisation”. As that progressed, Russia’s air campaign increased, while majorly featuring drone and missile attacks in preference for fighter bomber incursion, which run the risk of air defence. Why waste pilots and planes when you have drones and missiles? In that sense, Russia has waged a strategic air campaign that:

• looked different to US air campaigns because it was Russian;

• was adapted to Russia’s view of the Ukraine theatre;

• accounted for the air defence threats and limited aircraft and aircrew exposure to it; and

• expanded and evolved in line with changes in theatre.

Economically, the war quickly rendered Ukraine unable to fund and operate its normal state functions without direct financial support from the west. Ukraine was quickly economically crippled and remains so, which is why the west is paying for Ukraine to operate. Circa 35% of its population fled and with it all of their economic contribution. Ukraine cannot fund its own reconstruction from its own (reducing) GDP. VST would go as far as saying that once Phase 1 was over, Ukraine was technically bankrupt the moment it committed to fight in Phase 2.

Politically, in just the first phase of the war, Ukrainian leadership did a clear volte face once it became a full western proxy and agreed to deliver western objectives of “fighting to the last Ukrainian” as a means to test and overextend Russia. That stance led to the decimation we see today that extends beyond its borders and around the globe. All that damage was triggered by Russia’s opening air salvoes and fast advance of circa 100k Russian troops in Phase 1, that did - to an initially limited extent - damage or shock enough of Ukraine to bring Zelensky to the table.

It is clear now and was clear in Phase 1 that Russia entered quickly at a massive troop disadvantage and could never have held the ground it initially covered or take more than that. The west cited this as Russian incompetence, poor planning, weakness etc that its tactical retreats reconfirmed. In January 2022, Ritter said that a ground campaign focused on destroying Ukraine’s army was to be expected from the outset. On this, it would appear that he was wrong because Russia instead selected an initial, predominantly ground-based “speed shock” entry that would, despite telegraphed build up of forces, surprise and scare Ukraine into capitulation. When that didn’t work (thanks to western sponsorship emboldening Ukraine), Phase 2 began. Russia shifted emphasis to focused ground-heavy engagements that destroyed Ukrainian forces positioned in the east of the country that had been positioned to clear out the DPR and LPR separatists. Ritter missed Phase 1, but Phase 2 is what he predicted.

This territorial time-lapse video demonstrates this and illustrates Ritter’s general observation about the role of territory in attrition warfare.

We see the huge scale of territory into which Russia initially advanced with its small force. It made a fast run from the north to threaten Kiev while extending from already held territory in the east and south. It then withdrew from the north and consolidated east and south, where it has been holding territory ever since in line with its territorial focus on the DPR, LPR and regions inhabited by Russian or sympathetic populace. From that front line, it has attrited Ukrainian forces and weakened more and more of the wider country using increasing amounts of deep air strikes. In short, from Phase 2 onward, Russia has conducted a precise and focussed strategic air campaign “coupled with a focused ground campaign designed to destroy an enemy’s army as opposed to occupy its territory.”

VST will award Ritter half a point here.

Given the overwhelming supremacy Russia has both in terms of the ability to project air power backed by precision missile attacks, a strategic air campaign against Ukraine would accomplish in days what the U.S. took more than a month to do against Iraq in 1991.

On the ground, the destruction of Ukraine’s Army is all but guaranteed. Simply put, the Ukrainian military is neither equipped nor trained to engage in large-scale ground combat. It would be destroyed piecemeal, and the Russians would more than likely spend more time processing Ukrainian prisoners of war than killing Ukrainian defenders.

It appears Ritter was, in hindsight today, wrong on both the above counts. But remember: this article reflects his pre-invasion expectations of how Russia would fight in Ukraine based on the OpFor that existed in Jan 2022. It appears that Ritter expected an opening US-style overwhelming air campaign to have been unleashed on a much wider scale and intensity than was actually seen. Had Russia “done a USA”, what would the outcome and the civilian body count have been? Probably something comparable to what the USA achieved in Iraq, which is huge. Russia has not killed the numbers of civilians in Ukraine that the USA did in the Iraq war over similar timeframe.

Iraq Body Count claims 12,152 civilian deaths in 2003 with the invasion starting in March. IBC estimates 180-210k total deaths. Three other sources estimate 151-601k deaths with varying degrees of specificity into combatant and civilian deaths.

14 months into Iraq, 16,387 civilian deaths occurred per IBC figures. 14 months into Ukraine and UN OCHCR claims 8,574 civilian deaths, which is half that of Iraq. However, there is more to consider about these numbers. To wit:

• A totting up of UN’s Ukrainian figures don’t match its claimed total counts¹;

• The UN figures include casualties on both sides. Russia didn’t kill the civilians on its own side.

• Iraqi civilian casualties do not significantly comprise US or US-sympathetic civilians that the US was protecting in theatre. Russia is protecting Russians in Ukraine/DPR/LPR/Crimea.

• Iraq casualty counts are possibly affected/obfuscated by the “enemy combatant” classification.

If Ritter is wrong here in hindsight that may be because of faulty assumptions about how Russia would fight, its view on the consequences of massive initial airstrikes, and its misjudging western involvement. Therefore, it is arguably unfair or inadequate to judge this statement against today’s picture.

Consider the military picture in January 2022. Global Fire Power:

• ranked Ukraine’s military strength 22/140

• estimated 500k total personnel comprising 200k active personnel, 250k reserves and 50k paramilitaries

• ranked Russia 2/140

• estimated 1.35m total personnel comprising 850k active, 250k reserves and 250k paramilitaries

The above differences are magnified by arsenals and experience, which the ranking assumedly goes some (unknown) way towards reflecting. On this ranking basis alone, should Russia have chosen to increase the force size from day 1 to unleash a maximal land, sea and air campaign, Ritter’s statement and expectation of the overwhelming of Ukraine seems reasonable. Russia just didn’t wage war like that at all in Phase 1, then the west entered and Phase 1 ended.

Two things support Ritter’s statement: Russia’s fast entry brought Zelensky (who knew his then force capability) to the table; the picture changed because western intervention changed the military and political picture.

Ritter believed that as things stood in January 2022, Russia would certainly defeat Ukraine. He did not predict western entry and Phase 2. At that time, who did?

For any Russian military campaign against Ukraine to be effective in a larger conflict with NATO, however, two things must occur—Ukraine must cease to exist as a modern nation state, and the defeat of the Ukrainian military must be massively one-sided and quick. If Russia is able to accomplish these two objectives, then it is well positioned to move on to the next phase of its overall strategic posturing vis-à-vis NATO—intimidation.

In other words, in order for Russia to be successful in forcing NATO to back off, it had to effectively wreck Ukraine and change its nature from what it was in Q1 2022, and it had to do it “one-sided[ly] and quick”. Russia has changed Ukraine and could change it further. The west itself is now entertaining outcomes that could carve up Ukraine even more than now. Russia has done this without intervention or support from other nations, against up to 50 nations. The Ukraine war, to date, is actually short given the players and forces involved. It’s too soon to know exactly what “quick” is, because the fighting has to stop for us to call a timeframe.

While the U.S., NATO, the EU, and the G7 have all promised “unprecedented sanctions,” sanctions only matter if the other side cares. Russia, by rupturing relations with the West, no longer would care about sanctions. Moreover, it is a simple acknowledgement of reality that Russia can survive being blocked from SWIFT transactions longer than Europe can survive without Russian energy. Any rupturing of relations between Russia and the West will result in the complete embargoing of Russian gas and oil to European customers.

VST calls in favour of Ritter here both then and now.

There is no European Plan B. Europe will suffer, and because Europe is composed of erstwhile democracies, politicians will pay the price. All those politicians who followed the U.S. blindly into a confrontation with Russia will now have to answer to their respective constituents why they committed economic suicide on behalf of a Nazi-worshipping, thoroughly corrupt nation (Ukraine) which has nothing in common with the rest of Europe. It will be a short conversation.

Ritter was and remains generally right. Some small fish Euro leaders have walked. Internal stress is hugely increasing. Ukraine’s grotesque corruption has been multiply called out, admitted, internally reacted to and persists. Ukrainian refugees are triggering stress in multiple forms across the EU and UK. Despite all this, the EU Commission remains the lackey of US Ukraine plans.

If the U.S. tries to build up NATO forces on Russia’s western frontiers in the aftermath of any Russian invasion of Ukraine, Russia will then present Europe with a fait accompli in the form of what would now be known as the “Ukrainian model.” In short, Russia will guarantee that the Ukrainian treatment will be applied to the Baltics, Poland, and even Finland, should it be foolish enough to pursue NATO membership.

It’s important to be clear about what Ritter meant. After the war is done, assuming Russia wins, if NATO tries to build up elsewhere and again on Russia’s borders, Ritter believed that we should expect the Bear to charge out of its cave again, this time being prepared to muscle off an actual NATO state. In January 2022, Finland wasn’t in NATO but Poland and the Baltics were. In Ritter’s view, Russian victory in Ukraine will enable Russia to further credibly intimidate NATO to stop its advance. Judging Ritter’s January 2022 hypothetical can only be done today with another hypothetical. It doesn’t matter that Finland has joined NATO and that Sweden may too join. Ritter was stating that Russia would, if victorious and still threatened by still continuing NATO build up, actually start swinging sticks at NATO states presenting the threat. Let’s consider a maximal border engagement using GFP 2023 rankings and information:

Format (Rank/Total. Active military personnel/reserves/paramilitaries 000s)

• Estonia 104/145. 4/230/16.

• Latvia 95/145. 6.5/15/8.2.

• Lithuania 93/145. 16/15/11.

• Finland 51/145. 24k/900k/14k. Actively today, Finland is a 10th of what Ukraine was.

• Poland 20/145. 120k active, 0 reserves, 32.5k paramilitary. It’s similar (net smaller) than Ukraine was in 2022.

Add up total active manpower and it’s 200k. Mobilisation requires significant lead time, effort and equipping beyond likely present stocks; men without weapons are as useful as weapons without men so mobilising reserves is only of value if they are equipped to fight effectively. Assuming these capabilities remain roughly stable over the next 12 months, all these nations combined may represent similar a force presented by Ukraine alone, spread out over a larger area and fronts, not all of whom will wish to actually fight (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in particular). Poland is likely to be the most willing, with expected NATO back up. The hypothetical question of “can Russia handle two Ukraines in a row?” must be accompanied by “can NATO handle and supply two Ukraines in a row?”. We leave it for you to ponder and then judge Ritter’s January 2022 hypothetical statement.

Russia won’t wait until the U.S. has had time to accumulate sufficient military power, either. Russia will simply destroy the offending party through the combination of an air campaign designed to degrade the economic function of the targeted nation, and a ground campaign designed to annihilate the ability to wage war. Russia does not need to occupy the territory of NATO for any lengthy period—just enough to destroy whatever military power has been accumulated by NATO near its borders.

This seeming repetition of an earlier point is about to what happens after Ukraine. Ritter said that Russia will immediately smash subsequent threats if and when it detects them, dispensing with any of the diplomacy it undertook since 1991. Why? Because there is no Russian logic to give a depleted NATO that failed the Ukrainian test any chance to catch its breath. NATO was and remains an organisation that is the increasingly stated and proven enemy of Russia and its member states have admitted and proven their duplicity. What more needs to be understood by the Russians?

Again, this hypothetical is presently impossible to judge in the absence of the requisite pre-conditions.

And—here’s the kicker—short of employing nuclear weapons, there’s nothing NATO can do to prevent this outcome. Militarily, NATO is but a shadow of its former self. The once great armies of Europe have had to cannibalize their combat formations to assemble battalion-sized “combat groups” in the Baltics and Poland. Russia, on the other hand, has reconstituted two army-size formations—the 1^stGuards Tank Army and the 20^th Combined Arms Army—from the Cold War-era which specialize in deep offensive military action.

Even Vegas wouldn’t offer odds on this one.

“A battalion is a military unit, typically consisting of 300 to 1,000 soldiers commanded by a lieutenant colonel, and subdivided into a number of companies (usually each commanded by a major or a captain).”

The 1st Guards Tank Army comprises perhaps 500 - 800 tanks.

The 20th Combined Arms Army comprises currently 2 motor rifle divisions, 2 artillery/missile brigades + several other auxiliary regiments.

We can think through where things stand today, and try to assess Ritter’s outlook. If:

• Ukraine has depleted and weakened NATO;

• Russia is and remains ahead on manpower and war stocks;

• Russia can wage the Ukraine war again but faster and harder from the outset;

• Russia convinces its populace of another credible threat;

then Ritter’s view is feasible. Nukes may be the only definitive thing that would stop subsequent Russian war against Poland, Finland and/or the Baltics.

Sherman will face off against Ryabkov in Geneva, with the fate of Europe in her hands. The sad thing is, she doesn’t see it that way. Thanks to Biden, Blinken and the host of Russophobes who populate the U.S. national security state today, Sherman thinks she is there to simply communicate the consequences of diplomatic failure to Russia. To threaten. With mere words.

What Sherman, Biden, Blinken, and the others have yet to comprehend is that Russia has already weighed the consequences and is apparently willing to accept them. And respond. With action.

One wonders if Sherman, Biden, Blinken, and the others have thought this through. Odds are, they have not, and the consequences for Europe will be dire.

Western diplomacy failed to operate in light of Russia’s demands of Dec 2021, which were flat out rejected, despite representing a very good deal by today’s standards. That deal saw Russia out of the territorial picture. Minsk before it did too. The Ukraine would have been a complete nation with self governing regions and none of the 2022 damage. Russia had, as Ritter stated, made a full decision that if its last ditch offer failed and/or other red lines were crossed, it was going in. The offer failed, Zelensky crossed the “I want nukes” red line and Russia wasn’t bluffing. The consequences for both Ukraine and Europe have been dire.

1. The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) recorded 23,015 civilian casualties in the country: 8,574 killed and 14,441 injured. This included:

• 18,514 casualties (6,661 killed and 11,853 injured) in territory controlled by the Government when casualties occurred:

• In Donetsk and Luhansk regions: 9,526 casualties (3,963 killed and 5,563 injured); and

• In other regions¹: 8,988 casualties (2,698 killed and 6,290 injured).

• 4,501 casualties (1,913 killed and 2,588 injured) in territory occupied by the Russian Federation when casualties occurred:

• In Donetsk and Luhansk regions: 3,003 casualties (663 killed and 2,340 injured); and

• In other regions²: 1,498 casualties (1,250 killed and 248 injured).