COGNITIVE WARFARE: An introduction to how governments use info against you
Unconventional warfare to alter cognition, exploit biases, provoke thought distortions, influence decision-making and hinder action.
Introduction
Cognitive warfare (CW) is not a fringe concept or speculative theory. It is an emergent, doctrinally recognised domain of military and strategic competition. As NATO’s Allied Command Transformation asserts, CW is “now with us,” operating invisibly with devastating effects: “all you see is its impact, and by then … it is often too late.” Unlike traditional warfare, CW manipulates how individuals and populations think, perceive, decide, and act, often without their awareness. It integrates psychological, technological, and sociopolitical tools to shape cognition as both an operational target and a battlespace.
This article is intended as an accessible entry point into the CW concept. It outlines a formal NATO definition of CW, its operational principles, real-world applications, historical context, ethical challenges, and potential implications for democratic societies. Drawing primarily on NATO’s Cognitive Warfare concept1, it aims to foster awareness and empower individuals to navigate this invisible battlefield. Further details on impacts and defense methods will follow in subsequent discussions.
Cognitive Warfare: The Sixth Domain of Modern Conflict
Cognitive warfare transcends traditional propaganda or media manipulation. NATO defines it as:
“An unconventional form of warfare that uses cyber tools to alter enemy cognitive processes, exploit mental biases or reflexive thinking, and provoke thought distortions, influence decision-making and hinder actions, with negative effects, both at the individual and collective levels.”
Unlike cyber warfare, which targets information systems, CW targets what human minds do with that information, aiming to induce “perceptual distortion,” “motivational degradation,” and “loss of trust in processes.” Its goal is long-term structural effects on belief formation, memory, and group dynamics.
Key Features of CW:
Technologically mediated but psychologically grounded: It leverages digital platforms but is rooted in human cognition.
Targets individual and collective cognition: It operates at both personal and societal levels.
Operates below the threshold of war: It circumvents traditional legal and ethical frameworks, making it deniable.
Draws from diverse disciplines: It integrates cybernetics, neurology, sociology, and strategic communication to disrupt independent reasoning.
Historical Context
While CW is framed as a novel “sixth domain” of warfare, its roots lie in historical practices like propaganda and psychological operations (PSYOPS). During the Cold War, for instance, both the U.S. and Soviet Union used radio broadcasts and leaflets to shape enemy perceptions. What distinguishes modern CW is its scale and precision, enabled by digital technologies, big data, and behavioral science. These advancements allow for targeted, real-time manipulation of cognition at an unprecedented level.
How Is It Applied?
CW operates across multiple vectors—social media, entertainment, education, search engines, memes, political narratives, and interface design. It exploits “cognitive biases” and manipulates “attention, stress, and decision fatigue,” as noted in NATO’s report. It is active “before, during, and after kinetic actions” and, increasingly, within a country’s own borders, delivering “imbalances that will benefit their stewards and hinder those targeted.”
Techniques Include:
Saturation of information: Flooding platforms with contradictory data to induce apathy, as seen in disinformation campaigns during the 2016 U.S. election, where Russian-linked actors spread conflicting narratives to sow confusion.
Framing bias: Repeated, emotionally charged narratives, such as fear-based public health messaging during the COVID-19 pandemic, which shaped compliance but sometimes eroded trust when inconsistent.
Reflexive control: A Russian doctrinal method offering selected information to elicit specific decisions, exemplified by orchestrated leaks during the 2014 Ukraine crisis to influence Western responses.
Cognitive overload: Overwhelming decision-making with excessive data, such as algorithmically curated newsfeeds that amplify polarizing content.
Soft power weaponisation: Turning cultural outputs, like films or music, into strategic tools, as seen in China’s use of state-backed media to promote national narratives globally.
Case Study: Cambridge Analytica
An example of CW is the Cambridge Analytica scandal (2016–2018)2, where data harvested from millions of Facebook users was used to create psychographic profiles for targeted political ads. By exploiting cognitive biases like confirmation bias, these campaigns influenced voter behavior in the 2016 U.S. election and Brexit referendum, demonstrating CW’s ability to shape democratic outcomes covertly.
Cambridge Analytica is an essay, lightweight and arguable CW example, included here as a starting point. It is by no means definitive or exemplary.
Strategic and Operational Use
CW is formally recognized as a “sixth domain” of operations alongside land, sea, air, space, and cyber. National militaries have integrated it into their doctrines:
Canada: The Department of National Defence’s MINDS program explores CW to shape pre-conflict information environments.
France: Military doctrine incorporates psychological and perceptual influence in national security planning.
United States: Leaders like Gen. David Goldfein have noted that modern warfare “has moved from wars of attrition to wars of cognition.”
Domestic Application and Ethical Challenges
Historically aimed at foreign adversaries, CW is increasingly applied domestically. The 2012 Smith-Mundt Modernization Act in the U.S. repealed restrictions on government messaging targeting domestic audiences, enabling the Department of Defense to influence public perception. This raises ethical questions: while intended for national security, such practices risk undermining trust when perceived as manipulative. For example, coordinated public health campaigns during COVID-19, blending behavioral science with messaging, blurred the line between public service and psychological influence. As NATO’s report warns, “victims usually realize they were attacked too late.”
This domestic application exists in a legal grey zone. While technically permissible, it challenges democratic principles like informed consent. If governments use CW tools to shape public behavior, how can citizens distinguish between education and manipulation? This tension demands scrutiny to balance security needs with democratic integrity.
Why It’s Hard to Detect
CW is designed to be invisible. As Claverie and du Cluzel note, “The most efficient action... is to encourage the use of digital tools that can disrupt or affect all levels of an enemy’s cognitive processes.” It operates on three levels:
Subliminal: Algorithmic curation or interface logic, like social media feeds prioritizing divisive content.
Liminal: Emotionally suggestive media, such as viral memes with subtle ideological cues.
Supraliminal: Overt narratives wrapped in national or corporate branding, like state-sponsored news.
Even when messages are visible, the system-level structure—repeated cues, emotional hooks, and trust engineering—is often missed, making CW uniquely insidious.
Implications for Democracy
CW potentially erodes the foundations of liberal democracy: informed consent, civic agency, and legitimate public deliberation. It raises critical questions:
Can democratic participation be genuine when thought is strategically pre-shaped?
If trust is targeted, how can shared reality be maintained?
What distinguishes manipulation from education or counter-extremism?
Claverie and du Cluzel warn: “The objective is to attack, exploit, degrade or even destroy how someone builds their own reality, their mental confidence, their trust in processes”.
This threat to democratic integrity is compounded by the potential for CW to polarize societies, as seen in the amplification of divisive narratives on social media platforms, which erode communal trust and shared facts.
Defensive Posture and the Human Domain
CW blurs traditional distinctions between war and peace, civilian and combatant, foreign and domestic. NATO’s exploration of a “human domain” of operations recognizes the cognitive, psychological, and sociotechnical dimensions of conflict. To counter CW, societies must adopt proactive defenses:
Build Cognitive Resilience: Media literacy programs, like those implemented in Finland’s education system, teach citizens to critically evaluate information sources and recognize manipulation tactics.
Enhance Transparency: Governments and tech companies should adopt protocols to disclose algorithmic curation and strategic messaging, fostering accountability.
Secure Human–Machine Interfaces: As neurotechnologies and bioenhancement emerge, safeguarding data privacy and cognitive autonomy is critical. For example, regulations like the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) can serve as models.
Promote Independent Journalism: Supporting fact-based, investigative reporting counters CW’s narrative control, as seen in outlets exposing disinformation campaigns.
Foster Community Engagement: Grassroots initiatives, such as local discussion groups or civic education, empower individuals to rebuild trust and shared reality.
Empowerment Through Awareness
While CW’s invisible nature can feel overwhelming, individuals are not powerless. Critical thinking, cross-checking sources, and engaging in open dialogue can mitigate its effects. By understanding CW’s tactics, citizens can reclaim agency over their perceptions and decisions, turning awareness into a shield.
As an introduction, this article doesn't seek to embellish on defence, merely acknowledge it.
Conclusion
Cognitive warfare is not speculative; it is doctrinal and operational across NATO states, the broader West, and geopolitical adversaries. It weaponizes perception, culture, information, and decision-making, targeting “how the enemy thinks, how its minds work, how it sees the world,” with effects that alter worldviews, as NATO’s report emphasizes.
Yet, this is not a cause for despair but a call to action. By learning from historical precedents, recognizing real-world applications like Cambridge Analytica, and adopting defensive measures, individuals and societies can resist CW’s influence. Awareness, coupled with critical thinking and civic engagement, is the first line of defense. As Claverie and du Cluzel note, the battle is for “mental self-confidence” and trust in processes—values worth defending.
Understanding CW is not paranoia—it is strategic literacy in an age where the mind is the battlefield. Citizens, journalists, educators, and policymakers must work together to protect democratic integrity and ensure truth remains a shared foundation, not a strategic weapon.
Most people are hollow vessels waiting to be filled. If people have no philosophical and/or faith grounding they have no framework or anchor. We carry our own prison guards around with us (Smart phones) and they will reprogram the next generation with AI. The big black monolith (iPhone) that the apes were worshiping in 2001 a space odyssey was released in 1968. They have been working towards this for a long time and have a tight schedule.