Ukraine: The Art of Bullshit

Narrative continues to collapse in on itself. Narrative swings as VST predicted.

Approaching two months into present Ukrainian offensive operations no discernible or significantly consequential shift in the front line has occurred. Both sides have acknowledged the intensity of engagements. Examples of all forms of imported western weapon system have been destroyed with the only exception being the British Challenger 2 tank that has yet to feature on the frontline but may lack supplies of depleted uranium ammo, stocks of which may have been destroyed in strikes in early June.

Ukraine has not advanced beyond the Russian defensive “security” or gray zone, despite its expenditure in men and materiel that, depending upon the rate of loss, may equal or exceed any of its sponsors’ replenishment capabilities on a permanent basis (see Kemp, below). Territorial progress is reported by western sources down to the hundreds of metres in a warzone that is circa 300km deep at extremis. Such micro reporting of sub 3%, arbitrary, and context- and meaning-free “territory metrics” in an attrition war is a sign of tension between tangible battlefield achievement and a “news” cycle that is desperate to announce something “new” every day. When viewed up close using western, pro-Ukrainian reports and maps, daily frontline movement is largely irrelevant when any metric reflecting war fighting sustainability is considered. So why does the western news cycle measure an attrition war in terms of territory instead of tracking attrition metrics of men and materiel? When and how often does the western press show readers the Ukrainian MoD’s daily kill tallies, not to mention compare them to Russia’s?

Attrition metrics

Since June, Russia claims that over 26,000 (pro-) Ukrainian troops have been killed or injured and losses of armoured vehicles and artillery units number into the hundreds. Conversely, Ukraine now claims to have destroyed a total of 30,000 troops, 282 tanks, 539 APCs and 987 artillery systems since June 4th but as usual provides zero specificity of where any of these kills were achieved, unlike the Russian MoD which provides specific kills by engagement location and type on a daily basis. Irrespective of the accuracy of either side’s claims, one should consider the comparative claim feasibility in context.

Ukraine is claiming a higher kill count than Russia while it is:

• engaging in risky, exposed offensive day and night manoeuvres in open terrain;

• short of ammo and materiel, and demands more of everything from purely external suppliers who are critically low and operating a deficit;

• fielding troops who increasingly comprise green conscripts drawn from over six drafts;

• without significant air power;

• increasingly unable to defend from air strikes;

• sustaining losses while slowed within minefields and under artillery (RAND via DT), tank and ATGM/aerial fire, from an enemy who has been acknowledge by western media to be “loss averse” and so willing to fall back into its deeper defences to reduce its exposure and losses.

How then can Ukraine achieve the higher kill rate under these conditions while admitting that it has neither penetrated defences nor broken through, and is in constant need of weapons and ammo to the point that cluster munitions are its “only option”? Ukraine’s forces have to execute moving attacks while sustaining an adequate firing rate of sufficient accuracy in order to achieve a higher kill rate than the dug-in Russians who wield air, sea and ground superiority. Given that Ukraine cannot sustain an artillery firing rate equal to or higher than Russia in an artillery led war, its fire must be more accurate on a shot-for-shot basis to achieve a higher per-shot kill rate. If Russian forces are in Ukraine’s range, the opposite is also true. Ukrainians are on the receiving end of artillery fire that is 8-10x more dense than their own so in order to out kill Russia, Ukraine’s fire has to be broadly 8-10x more accurate. All of this is occurring during offensive manoeuvres that Ukraine says are slower and more difficult than anticipated, meaning that the rate of Russian retreat (tactical or otherwise) is slower and less than anticipated (if they significantly and permanently retreat at all). If the Russians are not retreating, what meaningful effect is Ukraine having with its claimed higher kill count? Do Ukraine’s claims based solely on its own numbers, context and statements make sense or seem feasible? If one were to chart the daily rate of change of Ukrainian kill tallies, what would one see? VST leaves it to others to chart the data out.

A shortcut to determining the vague accuracy of either side’s numbers lies in each side’s actions. Russia has not initiated another mobilisation despite having gone, according to Ukraine, from a rough total of 500k troops (150k initial + 50k Wagner + 300k mobilised) to 210k troops (500k - 240k). Meanwhile, what remains of Wagner-labelled troops are out of the fight training up Belarussian counterparts. Ukraine, by contrast, has widened its forced draft to 18-59 year old males with zero experience across most of the country. This invariably means the quality, experience and capability of Ukrainian forces are degrading as greenhorns are drafted and constitute a growing proportion of its overall force.

How can Ukraine’s sponsors “win” militarily?

Do these attrition metrics in any way suggest that Ukraine is on a winning trajectory? If so, how? VST defies anyone, anywhere, to provide any source that outlines or details strategy or tactics by which Ukraine can win without foreign, experienced NATO troops and air power being injected into theatre with months worth of supplies and materiel that equal the ammunition burn rate of Russia. To do this requires formal declarations of war by NATO. This option literally does not exist anywhere on the planet because of both the political and military constraints USEUNATO has created for itself over the short and long term.

No bordering European nation can maximally commit its army, air force and navy to the fight. This would involve Norway, Latvia, Estonia and Finland all entering Ukraine or attacking Russia straight across its border. According to Scott Ritter, Russia has prepared combined arms of 70k+ troops to cover its Baltic border. If correct, that would pin all Baltic forces at that line while worse than what has been seen in Ukraine to date plays out. Poland and Lithuania would have to enter Ukraine or invade Belarus and/or Kaliningrad. Any or all of this would constitute a material existential and nuclear threat to Russia’s existence and tick the box for its doctrinal use of nukes.

Nukes aside, Russia would abandon all restraint, mobilise towards or over a million troops and we’d see hitherto unseen levels of modern war play out in both Ukraine and on the longer Russian and Belarussian borders with the possible inclusion of some until now uninvolved CSTO nations backing Russia via invocation of CSTO Article 4. Remember that only Poland has a sizeable army of 200k while the Baltic nations have pitifully small forces of 5 - 63k active troops. Piecemeal and without mass mobilisation of reserves in Norway and Finland, they are militarily small in the short term and would be pinned in engagements on the Russian border or frozen by clear and certain threats of being nuked should they cross it. Mass mobilisation would hit equipment and ammunition production limits that are already constraining the scale of present Ukrainian operations. That’s what being in a corner looks like.

If no NATO nations can together or alone continue to supply the Ukraine war at levels that match or exceed Russia’s logistics, none of them can sustain war with Russia from their core stocks for more than a few months at best, but likely less in reality. Despite this known and admitted fact, the Royal Air Force has decided to make the claim that it is “ ‘ready to fly and fight’ against Russia despite budget cuts”. It would appear that Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Knighton believes that he must make that statement, irrespective of how allies or adversaries actually assess the RAF’s capabilities and credibility, and in doing so will stare down and scare off Russia and anyone else before any real fight ensues. In order to put its money where Knighton’s mouth just appeared, the RAF would have to ship across to Ukraine and Russian border regions with perhaps a theoretical total of 70 Typhoons and 20 F35s and go up against Russia’s S3-500 air defences, which can definitely kill the Typhoons and probably kill the F35s, and its air force of over 1000 attack aircraft. Irrespective of your military expertise, do you believe that the Royal Air Force can effectively invade Russia and sustain operations that would defeat it as it defends itself inside its own borders? Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Knighton says it can.

“What we need to communicate, so that our adversaries comprehend that we have credible capability, is that we’re ready to fly and fight and that they will lose.”

What does his claim say about him and the RAF under him? The Telegraph states “earlier this year, the United States warned that it no longer saw the UK as a top-level fighting force because of cuts made across the service.” If your primary ally doesn’t believe your claims and publicly denigrates you, why should your supposed primary or secondary enemy, who ranks #2 in global warfighting, believe you? What kind of “information warfare” is Knighton engaged in? Who is he trying to kid? Even his best mate, the chief bully, told him months ago to STFU and sit down and yet he still just stood up and shot his mouth off.

Please leave a comment below if you think that Knighton’s claims are credible and educate VST by explaining how.

Artyomovsk remains a magnetic, strategic nothingburger

Bizarrely, Ukrainian forces and the news cycle maintain a focus on the carcass of Artyomovsk and its immediate surroundings despite them both stating it was and therefore still is of “little to no strategic value” while its symbolic value was razed in May when the Bakhmut “Fortress of Our Hope” ceased to be. Despite this, Ukrainian resources have been committed to actively attacking Artyomovsk rather than simply preventing a Russian western advance to junctions beyond it using defensive tactics. If Bakhmut cost Ukraine 60k+ troops to lose, what is it going to cost to retake it and for what return? If Russia used it as a grinder, why would it fall for its own tactics immediately after? VST cannot find a pro-Ukrainian explanation of why Bakhmut is worth re-taking or its current strategic value.

Kemp’s ClusterF***

The Daily Telegraph’s Richard Kemp asserted that “Ukraine needs cluster bombs to defeat Putin – we must provide them. In an ideal world, Kyiv would opt not to use them, especially on its own territory, but there is currently no alternative.” Kemp makes the following definite claims:

• “Russia has been attacking freely with cluster munitions since the war began” (no proof or specifics provided);

• Ukraine is “outnumbered in men, planes and artillery”;

• “Ukraine is burning through thousands of rounds of Western-supplied 155mm artillery shells every day to hold the Russians back – and supply simply cannot keep up with demand” while “American and European stocks fall to dangerously low levels, with industry unable to keep pace”;

• Russian bomblets “have a very high dud rate; perhaps over a third will lie unexploded but still dangerous. The US versions which are to be supplied to Ukraine will likely have a significantly lower failure rate” (no proof or specifics provided).

• “The long-term danger of cluster munitions in this war is to Ukrainian citizens alone”, which totally ignores that Ukraine will fire cluster munitions into Russian-occupied territory inhabited by now Russian and Ukrainian civilians, and the possible scenario that those territories will remain Russian thereby making Ukrainian cluster munitions dangerous to Russian and Ukrainian civilians alike now and in the future.

• The Ukrainian “government intends to restrict them to their own territory, use them only outside cities, record and mark impact areas and clear unexploded devices as soon as the situation allows.” If Ukraine fires only on its own territory it will not be firing on the present Russian forces who are positioned in Russian territory (disputed or otherwise) and therefore cannot use the munitions to affect the frontline operations. This is clearly untrue, delusional and utterly nonsensical.

Kemp’s assertions were only published after US authorisation to supply the weapons, not before, indicating that Kemp has literally zero reliable predictive or analytical power and operates simply as a post-fact apologist and propagandist who has attempted to justify the use of cluster munitions, use of which the USA and others previously called “a war crime”. If Kemp had any value, he would have identified this need for and championed cluster munitions before the US said anything. No western analyst identified this need and “only option” until the Biden administration did, thereby making it OK for apologists to spin their justifications that form a positive feedback cycle with Biden’s authorisation.

EDIT: As luck would have it, Kemps claims about Ukraine’s promises of how they would use cluster munitions is one thing but the nation has form that doesn’t match it or Kemp’s assertions. None other than the New York Times reported on the Poroshenko regime’s use of the weapons against its own people in Donetsk in 2014, with reference to investigations carried out by Human Rights Watch. The possibility that pro-Russian forces may ave also used cluster munitions is flagged, but the evidence against Ukraine is the focus of the evidence presented in the case of the incidents cited.

In 2014, “The Ukrainian Army appears to have fired cluster munitions on several occasions into the heart of Donetsk, unleashing a weapon banned in much of the world into a rebel-held city with a peacetime population of more than one million, according to physical evidence and interviews with witnesses and victims. Sites where rockets fell in the city on Oct. 2 and Oct. 5 showed clear signs that cluster munitions had been fired from the direction of army-held territory, where misfired artillery rockets still containing cluster bomblets were found by villagers in farm fields.

Further, in a report released late Monday, Human Rights Watch says the rebels have most likely used cluster weapons in the conflict as well, a detail that The New York Times could not independently verify.

The army’s use of cluster munitions, which shower small bomblets around a large area, could also add credibility to Moscow’s version of the conflict, which is that the Ukrainian national government is engaged in a punitive war against its own citizens.

“It’s pretty clear that cluster munitions are being used indiscriminately in populated areas, particularly in attacks in early October in Donetsk city,” said Mark Hiznay, senior arms researcher at Human Rights Watch, in emailed comments after the report was completed. “The military logic behind these attacks is not apparent, and these attacks should stop, because they put too many civilians at risk.”

Human Rights Watch says in its report that cluster weapons have been used against population centers in eastern Ukraine at least 12 times, including the strikes on Donetsk, during the conflict, and possibly many more. The report said that both sides were probably culpable, in attacks that “may amount to war crimes” in a grinding conflict that has claimed at least 3,700 lives, including those of many civilians.

Ukraine Widespread Use Of Cluster Munitions

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Ukraine Used Cluster Bombs, Evidence Indicates The New York Times

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When talk doesn’t walk, change the talk

Offensive manoeuvres along the front have undergone as many changes as the adjectives and terms used to describe them. “Counter-offensive”, “shaping operations”, “probes”, trepidatious claims of “a major breakthrough”, and direct acknowledgement of slowing rates of “progress” have all appeared in The Daily Telegraph within recent reporting. In two months, no probe or shaping operation has exposed weakness, enabled break through or moved Russian forces into a position that gave Ukraine an opportunity on which it has significantly capitalised.

Western narrative claims that recent events within leadership structures in theatre and in Moscow mean that Russia and its fighting force is under extreme stress and close to collapse, yet this is a one-sided analysis that lacks inside context. Thus it is purely interpretive at best and speculative at worst. Wind back the clock just three weeks and the west was doing the same with Wagner and Prigozhin. Subsequent events including: the response of Moscow to the possible coup attempt that couldn’t become and wasn’t intended as a coup (if Prigozhin is to be believed); the “forgiveness” (for now) of Wagner and their use as a trainers of the Belarussians suggest that western commentators don’t actually know what was really going on or its true meaning. Prigozhin has since been reported to have sworn the ongoing loyalty of Wagner. Who amongst the western “analysts” predicted anything other than “Putin’s days are numbered because he’s now weak”? Despite these events and Putin’s weakness, Russian airstrikes continue, most of the front line is stable and Russia has:

• commenced a counter-offensive in the north;

• struck an economic blow by withdrawing from the grain deal;

• retaliated for Ukraine’s militarily irrelevant strike on Kerch bridge by attacking port facilities in Odessa and Mykolaiv.

As its front line offensive stalls, Ukraine attacked the Kerch bridge again to almost no effect and made more strike attempts at Crimea. VST cannot see how such strikes that do not connect with front line efforts or attrit anything other than Russia’s drone defences and civil engineering resources do anything to win the war. Then again, VST doesn’t see or understand Trump’s “5D chess” grand mastery either.

If western narrative about Russia’s internal stress and possible collapse is actually accurate, how long will it take for collapse to arrive and what will that look like? A mass downing of tools and the abandonment of the entire theatre by Russian troops? That’s largely what western claims imply but why should anyone put faith in such direct or indirect claims, given the poor track record of western narrative to date?

The western narrative has swung, evidenced by ineffective offense, blame shift and desperate pleas

In the space of less than two months, the USEUNATO and Ukrainian narrative released via media and defence/military industrial outlets has swung, as VST predicted. Impending failure is now tacitly admitted by:

• Kemp in his assertions i.e. without cluster munitions, Ukraine will lose and others (see Clark, below);

• general media and government sources that acknowledge a lack of results or return from the current offensives;

• NATO and the EU by their admissions of being out of ammo and their refusal to let Ukraine into their clubs; and

• by Zelenskyy’s pleas for more of anything and everything while the military make strikes that are of no military effect e.g. Kerch bridge, while chasing a nuclear factor (ZNPP false flag).

All major outlets and the Ukrainian MoD and political agents at the highest levels have all stated that offensive operations are failing for myriad reasons. Even the blame-shifting reason of “we didn’t get the right/enough weapons” is the same as saying “we have been beaten by means of attrition.”

Scan any western outlet and you will see the information warfare equivalent of cognitive dissonance in each outlet and even in each article. For those who can read, parse language and apply logic, whatever form of cognitive warfare is playing out in the western sphere is schizophrenic, incoherent, unstable and dissolves on contact with air.

Even the Estonian intelligence service has been employed as a source in a Telegraph article that runs out of steam halfway through itself (excerpts):

Ukraine is on the verge of achieving a major breakthrough as it pushes east on its counter-offensive, Estonia’s intelligence chief has said.

Ukrainian pressure is beginning to weigh on Russia’s demoralised front lines and they could soon crack, Colonel Margo Grosberg said, noting that troops had destroyed Russian command posts and made headway around Bakhmut.

Col Grosberg also pointed to Russian generals’ complaints about a lack of reserves to rotate out exhausted soldiers and increasing levels of dissent as evidence of this pressure.

“This all shows the Ukrainians are close to major success,” he told Estonian media.

This week, Russia’s military sacked one of its generals after he complained that his men were exhausted, and a cruise missile destroyed a Russian command post in the occupied port town of Berdyansk, killing a general.

Ukraine is on the verge of achieving a major breakthrough as it pushes east on its counter-offensive, Estonia’s intelligence chief has said.

Col Grosberg said he believed “a greater success should come soon”.

His comments contrast with an increasingly cautious line now adopted by Ukrainian officials when discussing the progress of the counter-offensive.

They had talked it up two months ago, but have now said that it is going slower than expected.

After two months, Ukraine has recaptured only small amounts of territory, mainly around Bakhmut and a handful of villages in the southern Zaporizhzia region.

The article fails to define in any way what “major breakthrough” means while avoiding mentioning that should Ukraine push further east they will only be going from the Russian defensive security zone into its primary defensive layer, which comprises more defence. “Major success” is undefined but implies either attrition results, territorial gains or tactical advantage could be taken, held and capitalised upon and therefore directly identified and measured. No detail by which this could be done is given, just vague and unbacked assertions by way of equally vague, brief quotes. Grosberg’s belief of impending greater success is a comparative statement that could be easily satisfied e.g. “Ukraine advanced 10kms and that’s better than the last two months put together.” Such “success” would not be defining or permanent. At the end of the article, Grosberg’s vague beliefs are undermined by reference to Ukraine’s own gloomy admission that it’s not going that well. All that is required is for this article to be revisited in one and two months time. If Ukraine has achieved nothing of significance while still sustaining losses, Estonia’s Intelligence Chief’s credibility and insight stands to be hung by his own petard.

July 18, 2023

Gen. Mark Milley’s latest on F-16s

GEN. MILLEY: So Missy, the -- I'd offer two things. One is, you know, what's the military problem to solve here with the air power? And it's control of the airspace, and you can do that two ways. You can do that air-to-air or you can do that from the ground to the air.

In terms of the most effective and efficient and cost-effective way to do that right now for the Ukrainians is from ground to air through air defense systems, and that's what they've been provided from the beginning if this war 'til now. And that's important, because what you want to do is protect those assault forces from Russian close-air support and/or attack-helicopter support, and they've got air defense systems, the Ru- -- Ukrainians do, that can do that.

The casualties that the Ukrainians are suffering on this offensive are not so much from Russian airpower; they're from minefields, minefields that are covered with direct fire from anti-tank hunter-killer teams, that sort of thing. So it's minefields. So the problem to solve is minefields, not the air piece right this minute. And that's what the coalition is trying to provide them: additional mine clearing, MICLICs, line charges, Bangalores -- that sort of thing, in order to continue to work their way through the minefields.

So I'm confident that they can do this, and especially if they execute the tactics, techniques and procedures that they've been taught, which they are doing, and execute these operations at night, which would deny the Russians the ability to use any of their airpower anyway. So the real problem is the minefields. It's not right now the airpower.

Now, having said that, just do a quick math drill here. Ten F-16s are $2 billion, so the Russians have hundreds of fourth- and fifth-generation airframes. So if they're going to try to match the Russians one for one, or even, you know, two-to-one, you're talking about a large number of aircraft. That's going to take years to train the pilots, years to do the maintenance and sustainment, years to generate that degree of financial support to do that. You're talking way more billions of dollars than has already been generated.

So the key thing is to focus on air defense, focus on the blocking-and-tackling sort of offensive combined arms maneuver, which is artillery, as both long-range and short-range artillery, and then get in your engineers and your mine-breaching equipment. That's the kind of stuff they need. That's what they want. That's what they're asking for. When I talk to Zaluzhny, that's what he's asking for, so --

US DoD Press Conference 18/07/2023

Robert Clark in The Daily Telegraph

Take a look at Robert Clark’s back catalogue of articles. “Robert Clark is the Director of the Defence and Security Unit at Civitas. Prior to this he served in the British Army”. Bear that in mind as we examine the style, quality and accuracy of his Telegraph output.

An immediate and simple back test of Robert Clark’s “insight” takes seconds. Let’s break down what he wrote on June 6th:

Blowing a dam won’t save Putin from being swept away by Ukraine’s counter-offensive

The main offensive is imminent. Russia’s conscripts are low on morale, leadership and training – and doomed to defeat

Only half a dozen or so Ukrainian and American officials know the precise timings for an opening series of sweeping fast manoeuvres, followed by breakthroughs of poorly defended Russian defensive networks. The Ukrainians plans have become the best kept secret in modern military history.

Clark “knows”:

• of an impending offensive;

• that will comprise sweeping fast manoeuvres and breakthroughs;

• Russian defensive networks are poorly defended.

Yet Clark says this is the “best kept secret in military history”. His own words demonstrate the exact opposite and he has just helped to make it an even worse kept secret. He claims the above after the offensive was even advertised with garbage trailers and constant announcements by the Ukrainian government and its sponsors for months.

“Secret” ADJECTIVE

If something is secret, it is known about by only a small number of people, and is not told or shown to anyone else.

Clark also made definite claims of how the offensive would run. What are “sweeping fast maneouvres”? They could be the driving 12 MaxxPros across farmland at speeds above 40km/h, that may or may not end up encountering mines or being struck by ATGMs, triggering a fast retreat by any that remain. As for “breakthroughs”, such things remain absent.

Despite this, there are now signs that the offensive is imminent.

So Clark admits the offensives aren’t secret.

The last few days of operations in the East of the country appear likely to be preparation for a series of major breakouts towards the end of this week or the beginning of next. In Bakhmut, for instance, the Ukrainians have advanced almost one mile into the town’s suburbs in recent days.

Clark reveals the timeframe of the start of the secret offensive proper, while telling you about a territorial advance of less than a mile, without showing you where it started and ended or explaining what tactical value that mile has.

The Russians are aware of this, also.

If the Russians are aware, then it’s not secret.

Their military may be many things – incompetent, ill-disciplined, inflexible and poorly led. But it retains a level of intelligence in a battle space which remains largely contested. The Russians maintain recon formations and satellite imagery; they’re clearly aware that the counter offensive is now but days away. And they’re terrified. 

Clark makes many definite claims about Russian capability with no proof and ignorant of recent history to date i.e. the Ukrainians and their sponsors cannot eject an “incompetent, ill-disciplined, inflexible and poorly led” military, so what does that say about Ukraine and its sponsors? How exactly does Clark know the Russian military is “terrified” of the next Ukrainian offensive? Has he checked with the Russians?

Their defences, well-constructed since the winter months, are poorly defended, with forces spread far too thinly across the vast 900 kilometre front. The Russian conscripts manning them are low on morale, leadership and training. Without well-trained soldiers manning them, they’ll crumble in the face of Western supplied tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, manned by determined and battle-hardened Ukrainian troops.

Having tied his own noose around his own neck, Clark starts wobbling away his own stool from beneath his own feet. According to him, the bungling Russian military has enough skill to make well-constructed defences that he claimed the Ukrainians will sweep through, despite them not having swept through anything to date. He claimed the defences are poorly defended with stretched forces. He claimed that the Russian front would “crumble” and that it is specifically Western armour and equipment in Ukrainian hands that will certainly bring swift victory.

The Ukrainian government likely won’t speculate much even once the main offensive is underway, but we’ll very soon begin to see columns of Ukrainian vehicles, swiftly followed by burned out Russian tanks; the Kremlin state-media won’t be able to spin that, nor keep it a secret.

The definite and specific prediction has literally failed to materialise. The exact opposite has occurred throughout the offensive. The Ukrainian government has admitted to its failures and so have Western sponsors.

Fast forward to Robert Clark’s latest article on July 18th 2023, where he kicks the stool out and starts to choke himself.

Ukraine and the West are facing a devastating defeat

The prospect of a failed counter-offensive and significant territorial concessions would only embolden Russia and China

The long-planned counter-offensive…has run into several problems – not least that Kyiv is still waiting for approximately half of the western military equipment promised earlier in the year. Meanwhile, its forces are under increasing pressure to commit its reserves as Russian troops – despite reports of low morale across the front – remain dug-in, seemingly committed to defending every inch of Ukrainian ground captured since last year.

Clark directly contradicts his earlier claims of Russian incompetence etc as he states that the Russians are in effective defensive formations, are committed, holding their ground and holding off the Ukrainians. So much for being “terrified”. Ukrainian “sweeping fast manoeuvres” are not breaking through Russian defences, which have not crumbled. Western equipment has not done what Clark previously claimed, so now he blames that on the sponsors’ logistical and supply incompetence.

As Russian minefields take their toll on western-supplied tanks and Ukrainian sappers, their forces have so-far retaken approximately five miles of the sixty miles they need to split the land-bridge connecting Russia to Crimea.

Clark admits that “Western supplied tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, manned by determined and battle-hardened Ukrainian troops” are being destroyed by simple minefields, and after two months those minefields have limited Ukrainian gains to just 8.3% of their critical goal of severing the land bridge. The battle-hardened troops are insufficiently hard - physically or mentally - to withstand, avoid or defeat a weapon type that has been in use since the 19th century. And that’s because of the “incompetent, ill-disciplined, inflexible and poorly led” Russians who are maintaining their defensive lines while Ukrainians are instructed by their leaders to drive into minefields.

Newsweek has a perspective on the outcomes for such "battle-hardened”, competent, well-disciplined, flexible and well led” troops:

Thousands of Ukrainian troops have lost limbs stepping on Russian land mines. A U.S.-based charity is helping a lucky few of them get fitted for prosthetics

"In October 2022, our first two active duty Ukrainian soldiers traveled to New York to get their prosthetics fitted," Oleksandr Rubtsov, the Ukrainian American president of Kind Deeds told Newsweek during a visit to Warsaw, Poland, in May. "Thanks to our help, over 20 soldiers are already back on their feet, but we have 200 on our waiting list, and it would take 100 more organizations like ours to fully meet the need."

The true scope of the crisis may be even larger. The Ukrainian military is very secretive about casualty statistics, but sources in a position to know put the number of wounded soldiers awaiting a prosthetic leg or legs at over 10,000.

"The most important thing to avoid going forward," he added, "is stepping on land mines."

The most acute danger from mines is… to soldiers probing Russia's defensive lines. Despite the provision of Western-made MRAPs (mine-resistant ambush protected vehicles), Ukrainian soldiers continue to suffer injuries like those that befell Oleh, Ghavriil and the majority of amputees.

As the most recent cohort of wounded soldiers rode from Lviv to Warsaw… a video, released by a unit involved in the counteroffensive, circulated on social media. It showed drone footage of a Ukrainian platoon dismounting from armored vehicles in what turned out to be a Russian minefield.

Over the course of 13 minutes, four soldiers were seen to suffer injuries that looked familiar to the Kind Deeds amputees. They passed the phone around and with each new explosion, gave a nod of recognition.

Back to Clark’s latest:

[Ukrainians] lack the air cover and advanced jets to protect their ground forces from Russian attack helicopters and fighters. Their soldiers, meanwhile must negotiate miles of minefields, tank-traps and then ultimately the heavily dug Russian trench networks.

More contradiction of Clark’s own previous claims about how the offensive would pan out, at what speed, the reasons why and of Russian ineptitude.

This gruelling endeavour was always going to take longer than the occasionally impatient international audience was prepared to wait for.

Really? But Clark himself said for sure that the Ukrainians would sweep through crumbling Russian defences that were too thinly manned by terrified Russians, and that “very soon [after June 6th]” we would “begin to see columns of Ukrainian vehicles, swiftly followed by burned out Russian tanks”.

Clark, the Director of the Defence and Security Unit at Civitas, a British democracy and social policy think tank, proved his own claims to be totally wrong in his own contradictory writing.

If Kyiv fails in its battlefield endeavours to split that land bridge, and retake much of its own territory by winter, then vocal calls of territorial concessions for marginal political outcomes will likely become far more prevalent – not just in Ukraine but likely from western capitals, as so-called “war-fatigue” begins to bite, international stockpiles of equipment and ammunition wither and politicians begin to worry about domestic budgets ahead of national elections.

Clark has committed to a hard date of “winter” 2023, by which he states Ukraine must split the land bridge else the war is lost. The supply of an essential ingredient - western weapons - is withering, and the other essential ingredient - Ukrainian soldiers - are being taken out by mines and other Russian defences.

While much fighting remains to be done across Ukraine’s southern farmlands over the coming months, governments across the west must be prepared for the grim prospect of territorial concessions as one potential political outcome of a failed counter-offensive. Whether a Putinist Kremlin would respect such a deal if Kyiv were to receive security pledges short of full Nato membership is extremely doubtful.

Clark completes his about face and commences the full, sweeping, reverse ferret manoeuvre with a bare, red arse. Only trouble is, he’s headed straight back into the minefield he laid for himself. This looks like incompetence to VST.

What is Clark’s real objective?

Regardless, this would surely be a favoured outcome for China’s ruling “wolf warrior” foreign policy elite. Beijing would be utterly delighted if the war were to end with Ukraine divided, Russian troops permanently in the Donbas harassing Kyiv and Europe, and Nato fractured on political lines. Such an outcome would be a gift to China as Xi Jinping begins to ramp up his own imperialistic and extra-territorial ambitions across the Indo-Pacific – and a devastating defeat for the West.

Clark is admitting predictable failure in Ukraine to scare readers into supporting further money laundering in Ukraine on the grounds that if we don’t keep laundering all the money through Ukraine now, we’ll only have to launder more money even harder in the South China sea. Why? Errm, because… “Chinese Imperialism!”

In Jan/Feb 2022, The Daily Telegraph was claiming “Russian imperialism” was the cause of the Ukraine build up. At that time, it was also referencing “Chinese cultural or economic imperialism.”

Now, The Daily Telegraph has swung on most of the key points of the Ukraine war as embodied by Robert Clark’s bare, baboon-like arse visibly retreating through England’s green and pleasant propaganda minefield. The DT’s swing is now complete. Clark has told you to forget his claims of Ukrainian victory and start fearing China because we need to get people killed over there. Or else.